[Deacon]

Look at this from the corporations' point of view.

If a biomonitor can be looped, if the data feed can be spoofed, then biomonitors are not a reliable security device, are they?  If someone can come along and fool a biomonitor, then how useful are they, really?

Also, my question wouldn't be 'How do I spoof a biomonitor', but 'How do I control the signalling device?'  After all, there's some device determining that the biomonitor is receiving alarm-inducing signals.  Control that device and the other guards never receive the alarm, maintaining the peaceful status.  And if that 'device' is a metahuman?  Even easier.  Bribery.  Blackmail.  Mind control.  Or social engineering.

When infiltrating a facility, my first requested piece of information is a personnel list if we can get it.  From that we can find guards who are susceptible to any of the above methods.  Or a manager who can direct guards away from an area.  Or be convinced that it's "just another fragging test/glitch".

[martinchaen]

For what it's worth, ProfGast was pretty close with his earlier comment about previous editions having alternatives.

edit (edit)
Edit allows you to create, change, or delete any kind of file. A Complex Action is required to alter one detail of a file: about a sentence of text or a detail of an image or about a second of video or audio (gamemaster’s discretion). This requires a successful Computer + Edit Test with a threshold set by the gamemaster using the Success Test Difficulties Table (p. 62) based on the extent, quality, and complexity of the edits being made. Continuous editing of a device’s output requires the expenditure of a Simple Action every Initiative Phase for the duration. Note that controlling the device (via the Control Device action, p. 229) may allow you simple control similar to Edit (i.e., by freezing image capture at source or turning off audio reception).

[firebug]

I apologize to ProfGast, I didn't mean to be rude.

Deacon has a good point.  Considering that Hosts are considered unreliable enough that "dangerous" IC aren't let roam freely (and I don't blame them, with how easy it'd be to tell one to just start fragging an employee to make a distraction) it would make sense for them to have a "human" element in control of monitoring the guards.

The security spider would be the obvious choice.  Of course, the problem there is that even if you simply brick them, they're either on site and can just say "oh shit I got bricked" or call with a backup commlink.  But that does sound at least more approachable.

[Csjarrat]

If a biomonitor can be looped, if the data feed can be spoofed, then biomonitors are not a reliable security device, are they?  If someone can come along and fool a biomonitor, then how useful are they, really?

Ok, so they can do the same with cameras, but they still use plenty of those!
Biomonitors are just one layer of a security structure that contains many layers of redundancy.
The biomonitors can be spoofed, but the spider might be watching the progress of their commlink's positional data intermittently to make sure it's sticking to the patrol route.
likewise, the security manager will be monitoring the guard's headcam feeds to make sure they're not slacking off.
Guards have to perform radio check-ins with passwords at frequent intervals to prove they're still on station and not unconscious in a janitor's cupboard somewhere.
Any of these systems will have the ability to trigger a wider alarm, so it doesn't matter that anyone of them can be defeated individually. The more layers of of overlapping systems you have like this, the easier it is to detect an intrusion and respond to it.
The idea of security from the corporations point of view is to detect the intrusion + respond in a timely manner whilst not blowing the entire year's operating profits on security efforts that just hinder its staff and lower their productivity (and hence the company's profitability) for the entire time the company isn't being broken into